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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 18-1553 
____________ 
 
OSCAR RIVAS, AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE 
ESTATE OF LESTER ESTURADO RIVAS RUANO, DECEASED, 
Appellant 
v. 
 
PROSPERO EQUIPMENT CORPORATION; 
PROSPERO WINERY, INC.; PROSPERO’S WINE MAKING SHOP, INC. 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-17-cv-03028) 
District Judge: Honorable Joel H. Slomsky 
____________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 13, 2019 
Before: HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and BIBAS, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: September 18, 2019) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
This appeal involves a dispute about service of legal process. Plaintiff-Appellant 
Oscar Rivas, in his capacity as administrator of the estate of Lester Esturado Rivas 
Ruano, filed a praecipe to issue writ of summons in Pennsylvania state court in 2014, but 
didn’t file a complaint until 2017. Soon after the complaint was filed, Defendants-
Appellees Prospero Equipment Corporation, Prospero Winery, Inc., and Prospero’s Wine 
Making Shop, Inc. (collectively, Prospero) removed the case to federal court and moved 
to dismiss for inadequate service of the writ of summons.  
In the course of a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the District Court ordered 
discovery on the service issue but did not set a deadline for submissions after discovery. 
App. 59 (“I’ll enter an order that fact discovery on the [service] issue . . . should be as . . . 
permissible until whatever that Friday is, the last Friday in January.”); see also Rivas Br. 
15 (conceding the discovery deadline). Though the District Judge did not enter a written 
order, his order on the record makes two things clear. First, discovery had to be 
completed by the last Friday in January 2018. And second, the District Court set no 
deadline for the parties to file their submissions. A month after discovery ended and 
before any submissions were filed, the District Court granted the motion to dismiss. We 
will now vacate and remand for the District Court to receive those submissions.1 
                                                 
1 The District Court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(1) and 
1441. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
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We begin by noting, as Rivas’s counsel concedes, this case became a “procedural 
mess.” App. 77. In both state and federal court, before and after this appeal was taken, 
many opportunities for Rivas to effectuate or demonstrate effective service came and 
went. We therefore share the District Court’s “concern[]” over the case’s handling. App. 
67. Nevertheless, Rivas deserves the opportunity to present the discovery results to the 
Court that ordered them. 
The rub of this appeal lies in that November 2017 hearing transcript on Prospero’s 
motion to dismiss. Although both parties completed discovery in time, neither submitted 
any findings before the District Court ruled on the motion to dismiss. Instead, Prospero 
pivoted away from the service of process argument and moved alternatively for judgment 
non pros based on the inactivity in state court from 2014 to 2017 (without reasserting the 
initial motion to dismiss). Rivas responded to that motion without addressing the motion 
to dismiss or the service issue. Three weeks after that response, assuming—with some 
justification—that the parties had nothing further to offer on the service issue, the Court 
granted the motion to dismiss. It explained why Rivas’s only evidence before the Court 
(that Prospero’s insurer had a copy of the writ of summons before the deadline for service 
had passed) did not satisfy his burden of proof for showing service was sufficient. App. 
63–67; see Grand Entm’t Grp., Ltd. v. Star Media Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d 476, 488 (3d Cir. 
1993). But the Court also mistakenly characterized the question of direct service on 
Prospero as “undisputed.” App. 65. Rivas did, in fact, dispute that point. See Pl.’s Resp. 
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in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 2–5, ECF No. 7 (arguing “the Writ of Summons was 
filed and served in a timely manner”). 
Although the District Court has “broad discretion” when it comes to Rule 12(b)(5) 
motions, Umbenhauer v. Woog, 969 F.2d 25, 30 (3d Cir. 1992), granting Prospero’s 
motion and dismissing the case without affording Rivas the benefit of explaining the 
results of the court-ordered discovery constituted an abuse of discretion. That ruling 
effectively faulted Rivas for blowing a nonexistent deadline. The Court stated that 
discovery would be “permissible until . . . the last Friday in January,” App. 59, without 
imposing any deadline for submissions thereafter. So Rivas’s counsel’s inaction did not 
warrant putting his client out of court. This is true even though counsel could have (and 
should have) brought this issue to the District Court on a motion for reconsideration 
instead of filing this appeal.  
After taking this appeal (and after the time to file a motion to reconsider had 
lapsed) Rivas moved the District Court to reopen and supplement the record,2 finally 
putting forward the evidence from discovery that tended to show at least electronic 
delivery of the writ of summons in 2014. The District Court should have the benefit of 
that evidence (and the parties’ positions on it) when deciding whether Rivas adequately 
served Prospero lo those many years ago. 
                                                 
2 The District Court’s opinion and order denying that motion are not before us, but 
we may take judicial notice of such developments after appeal is taken. See Samuel v. 
Univ. of Pittsburgh, 506 F.2d 355, 360 n.12 (3d Cir. 1974). 
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* * * 
For the reasons stated, we will vacate and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.3 
                                                 
3 The District Court technically granted Prospero’s non pros motion as well, but its 
explanatory footnote said nothing about it. Its silence on this point precludes this from 
serving as an alternative basis to affirm the District Court’s judgment. See generally Poulis 
v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984) (requiring application of several 
factors to evaluate the effect of a party’s failure to prosecute). 
